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n 1983 Martin Shapiro worried that the “new jurisprudence of values” being promoted by the new generation of public law scholars in political science would
“serve as a cover for slipping back into playing ‘little law
professor’ for undergraduates.” 1 Proponents of the “jurisprudence of values” in political science, who engaged in
constitutional theorizing about individual rights and the
structure of governing institutions, would “writ[e] conventional case law doctrine” that “contain[ed] no distinctive political analysis.” Worse, the fruits of the behavioral
revolution might rot should normative concerns take center stage in public law inquiry. Rather than further integrate the study of courts into mainstream political science,
public law scholars would spend their time telling Supreme
Court justices how to do their jobs. Shapiro predicted,
“[P]olitical scientists trained in the empirically oriented
‘American politics’ field will be shoved to the edges of
‘public law,’ and political jurisprudence will be converted
to ‘legal and political theory.’” 2 Abandoning American
constitutionalism was the best antidote for the threat a
jurisprudence of values presented to the social science study
of law and courts. Students of the judicial process, Shapiro declared in 1989, should explore “any public law
other than constitutional law, any court other than the
Supreme Court, any public lawmaker other than the judge,
and any country other than the United States.” 3
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Recent developments in the public law subfield have
confirmed some of these fears, while alleviating others.
Prominent scholars continue paying disproportionate attention to American constitutional law as handed down by
the Supreme Court of the United States. Twenty-nine of
the forty-two awards for scholarship given out since 1990
by the Law and Courts section of the American Political
Science Association have gone to works on the Supreme
Court or American constitutional law. This public law
scholarship, however, speaks with political science voices.
Both behavioral and humanistic scholars are developing
distinctive empirical and normative insights into American constitutional law, theory, and politics. Their work
makes connections between ongoing constitutionalist
themes and such traditional concerns of political science
as political development, rational agency, comparative analysis, political institutions, and political philosophy. Law
and Courts studies on the implementation of judicial decisions, sophisticated voting on constitutional courts, the
interaction between elected and judicial officials, constitutional analysis outside the courts, and the broader ideological foundations of constitutional doctrine are beginning
to lead, rather than always follow, academic law. A small
but increasing number of distinguished law professors now
borrow from public law analysis in political science to
garner new insights into American constitutionalism.4
Remarkably, at a time when more academic lawyers
play “little political science professor” in their scholarship,
many political scientists continue playing “little law professor” when teaching basic undergraduate courses on constitutionalism. The new constitutional scholarship in public
law has not made substantial inroads into the undergraduate syllabus. Undergraduates taking political science
courses on constitutional law too often read the same cases
and perform the same exercises as students taking second
year constitutional law courses in law school. Judging from
syllabi alone, the most important development in political
science scholarship during the past forty years has been
the additions to Robert McCloskey’s classic, The American
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confirm justices known to prefer a new regime.23 Finally,
justices who favor substantial reform lack the capacity to
bring about the necessary political changes. Justices do
not have the means to force recalcitrant officials to obey
their decrees and often lack the knowledge necessary to
bring about more desirable political states.24
The aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education (1954),
Rosenberg details, demonstrates these judicial incapacities. Although the Supreme Court declared segregated
schools unconstitutional in 1954, few children of color in
the South attended desegregated schools until elected officials passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which cut off
federal funds to school districts that continued to practice
Jim Crow.25 The lesson of this and other case studies,
Rosenberg concludes, is that political movements that rely
too heavily on litigation waste valuable resources better
employed mobilizing citizens for protests and electoral
campaigns.26
Subsequent scholarship challenges or elaborates Rosenberg’s thesis. Some works suggest that The Hollow Hope
underestimates the impact of litigation campaigns.27
Michael McCann’s Rights at Work details how judicial decisions influence constitutional bargains struck outside of
courtrooms and help mobilize citizens for nonlitigation
activities.28 The mere threat of litigation, his studies of the
movement for comparative worth finds, frequently inspired
businesses to make more favorable settlements with women
workers. Michael Klarman suggests that Brown began the
causal chain leading to integration by producing a severe
backlash among Southerners that eventually forced the
national government to take the affirmative steps necessary to eradicate Jim Crow.29
Political scientists use game theory to provide additional reasons for questioning the judicial capacity to
champion politically unpopular causes. Building on the
pioneering work of Walter Murphy,30 Lee Epstein, Jack
Knight, and Thomas Walker observe how justices find
legal and other excuses to refrain from challenging elected
officials whenever striking down a government policy might
provoke severe political retaliation.31 Challenging proponents of the popular attitudinal model of judicial decision
making, who claim that justices vote their sincere policy
preferences,32 proponents of the strategic model of judicial decision making insist that justices are sophisticated
policy voters. “[T]he Justices cannot effectuate their own
policy and institutional goals,” Epstein, Knight, and
Andrew Martin maintain, “without taking account of the
goals and likely actions of the members of the other
branches.” 33 This judicial tendency to avoid sharp challenges to the incumbent regime explains why the countermajoritarian difficulty that obsesses constitutional theory
in the law academy is a chimera.34 When judicial preferences diverge too sharply from the preferences of powerful
elected officials, justices avoid declaring the offending government action unconstitutional.35

Judicial practice during Reconstruction provides examples of strategic judicial behavior. In 1866 the Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus in the North. The majority opinion insisted that neither the national executive nor the
national legislature could declare martial law in areas where
courts were functioning.36 Over the next several years,
however, the justices found numerous jurisdictional excuses
to avoid deciding the constitutionality of legislation imposing martial law in the South, even though courts were
open in the covered jurisdictions.37 These decisions cannot be explained by judicial policy preferences; Epstein
and Walker point to much evidence indicating that a judicial majority objected to martial law in both North and
South. The justices behaved differently in the 1866 case
than in subsequent cases, they maintain, because the strategic environment for judicial policy making had changed.
Martial law in the North had been abandoned when the
justices declared that policy unconstitutional, but the
Reconstruction Congress would have retaliated against a
tribunal that interfered with martial law in the South.
Rational choice perspectives provide other insights into
the judicial process. Justices negotiate among themselves
as well as with outside officials. Forrest Maltzman, James
Spriggs, and Paul Wahlbeck detail the strategic bargaining
that takes place when judicial opinions are crafted. Their
research suggests that legal calls for principled opinions
are unrealistic. Judicial writing is typically a committee
product that incompletely harmonizes quite different
understandings of the law and the judicial function.38 James
Rogers offers a game theoretic explanation for legislative
willingness to tolerate the judicial power to declare legislation unconstitutional: sympathetic justices ensure that
laws serve their legislative purposes. When elected officials
believe the judicial majority shares their general policy
preferences and that justices have “better information on
the actual impact of the law relative to that available to
Congress when it enacted the law,” then legislative policy
commitments are best advanced by authorizing judicial
review of legislation.39 Courts typically strike down laws,
in this view, that elected officials would repeal had they
been as well informed as the justices. Congress will even
tolerate some instances of judicial review when legislative
and judicial preferences diverge, as long as elected officials
believe that justices most often declare unconstitutional
legislation that in practice is not serving its original legislative purpose.40
More humanistic political science studies further
undermine anxieties about the countermajoritarian difficulty by highlighting the political foundations of judicial
review. Challenging ritual incantations that “when the
Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act
or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will
of representatives of the actual people of the here and
now,” 41 scholarship in public law documents how “the
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representatives of the actual people of the here and now”
facilitate judicial review to advance shared constitutional
visions, to avoid taking responsibility for certain contested issues, such as abortion and slavery, and to entrench
politically vulnerable measures.42 Howard Gillman’s important study of late-nineteenth-century constitutional politics illustrates how electoral/judicial alliances are established
and function. His essay details the ways Republicans in
the wake of Reconstruction dramatically expanded judicial power in order to rationalize the emerging industrial
order.43 Abandoning conventional efforts to “discuss judicial power as if it were a by-product of essentially legal
choices that relatively independent judges make about the
proper scope of their authority,” he asserts, “the expansion
of federal judicial power in the late-nineteenth century is
best understood as the sort of familiar partisan or programmatic entrenchment that we frequently associate with
legislative delegations to executive or quasi-executive agencies.” Republican Party officials committed to “national
economic development” took two steps to facilitate favorable judicial policy making. First, they sponsored the Judiciary Acts of 1875 and 1891. These statutes dramatically
expanded federal court jurisdiction over the legal issues
raised by railroads and other corporations engaged in
national commercial activities. Second, Republicans staffed
the federal judiciary with corporate lawyers, many of whom
had close connections to the railroads. Subsequent Supreme
Court judicial decisions sharply limiting antitrust prosecutions, striking down the federal income tax, issuing
injunctions against labor unions, and banning state regulation of interstate railroads,44 Gillman concludes, “are
best viewed as ‘politically inspired,’” as “part of the Republican Party’s effort to restructure national institutions better to facilitate national economic development.” 45
Other political science studies further elaborate how
judicial power in the United States rests on support from
executives, legislators, and political movements. Kevin
McMahon explores how decisions by the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower administrations facilitated the
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.46 J. Mitchell Pickering and Cornell Clayton detail
the political foundations for Rehnquist Court decisions
that imposed federalism limits on national power.47 Keith
Whittington documents the tendency for judicial
supremacy—the view that justices have the final authority
to determine what the Constitution means—to be championed by leaders of decaying political coalitions who must
rely on the federal judiciary to buttress policies that no
longer command powerful electoral support. When uniting Southern and Northern Jacksonians in Congress
became more difficult, prominent Democrats before the
Civil War began to insist that the Supreme Court had the
sole power to determine the constitutional status of slavery in the territories. Judicial authority is typically challenged, Whittington notes, only when emerging political
138 Perspectives on Politics

coalitions must overturn past court rulings to establish
their own constitutional visions and authority. Lincoln
took a different position on judicial supremacy than James
Buchanan because he occupied a different position in political time.48 Several political scientists observe that interestgroup activity is often a prerequisite for the exercise of
judicial power. Susan Lawrence and Charles Epp, for example, conclude that the Supreme Court protects the rights
of the poor and various civil liberties only when powerful
political forces engage in long, expensive litigation campaigns. These campaigns are often supported by elite actors
within the national government. Favorable Supreme Court
decisions on welfare rights, Lawrence points out, were
consequences of dramatically increased funding for legal
services during the late 1960s.49
Comparative constitutional studies similarly find a global
explosion of judicial review more rooted in electoral politics than in judicial independence. Ran Hirschl’s “hegemonic preservation thesis” details how the rise of judicial
review in Israel, South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, and
many other countries resulted from actions taken by elected
officials and interest groups fearful of losing political
power.50 His Toward Juristocracy describes how in recent
years “constitutional reform” has served as a vehicle for
“tranferr(ing) an unprecedented amount of power from
representative institutions to judiciaries.” 51 As is the case
in the United States, judicial review is best conceptualized
as resulting from cooperation between justices and other
governing officials, rather than as a means by which an
apolitical judiciary checks the rest of the political system.
“When their policy preferences have been, or are likely to
be, increasingly challenged in majoritarian decisionmaking arenas,” Hirschl observes, “elites that possess disproportionate access to, and influence over, the legal arena
may initiate a constitutional entrenchment of rights and
judicial review in order to transfer power to supreme
courts.” 52 Fulfilling this constitutional mission, courts
throughout the world are more likely to strike down legislation that limits liberties exercised by the politically powerful than to protect powerless minorities. Thus, the right
to make unlimited campaign contributions is presently
gaining more judicial solicitude worldwide than rights to
basic necessities. Hirschl’s study of comparative constitutional law in action “contrast(s) the limited impact of constitutionalization on enhancing the life conditions of the
have-nots with its significant contribution to the removal
of so-called market rigidities and the promotion of economic liberties.” 53
Other comparative studies document numerous political dimensions of the global constitutional experience.
Exploring the legislative politics underlying the establishment of constitutional courts in Western Europe, Alec
Stone Sweet finds that judicial review is more often established by legislative edict than judicial decree.54 The strategic model of judicial decision making is being exported

with much success.55 James Gibson, Greg Caldeira, and
Vanessa Baird detail how the concepts of specific and diffuse support for courts developed in the United States
help explain public attitudes toward national courts
throughout Europe. Elites throughout the world, they find,
are inclined to trust courts when they approve of the actual
trend of judicial decisions in their society (specific support), while average citizens who typically know very little
about specific court decisions are more inclined to trust
courts as generally committed to the rule of law (diffuse
support).56
Many works, conversely, use insights from comparative
constitutionalism to explain dimensions of American constitutionalism. Leslie Goldstein claims the strong veto powers given to nations in the European Union partly explains
why contemporary decisions by the European Court of
Justice limiting the power of nation states provoke less
resistance to judicial authority than did analogous decisions by the early-nineteenth-century Marshall Court that
were routinely ignored by local officials.57 Gary Jacobsohn explains differences in religious freedom in India,
Israel, and the United States as consequences of respective
constitutional efforts to disestablish a previously established religion, maintain an established religion, and prevent any religion from becoming established.58 A different
comparative focus is provided by important work recently
published on constitutionalism in the fifty states.59
Other areas of public law research on constitutionalism
might be highlighted. The attitudinal model remains
vibrant; 60 Dan Pinello has published a sophisticated analysis linking judicial votes in gay rights cases to a variety of
demographic and political factors.61 Political scientists have
authored influential studies on the processes by which
federal justices are nominated and confirmed.62 Members
of the Princeton school of constitutional thought produce
fascinating work offering more philosophical perspectives
on American constitutionalism.63 Political scientists sympathetic with originalism have sparked important controversies with their investigations into Marbury v. Madison
(1803), the origins of American constitutionalism, and
the changing nature of American judicial review.64 Studies of individual justices remain popular,65 as do studies of
particular areas of constitutional policy making. Donald
Downs has written fascinating accounts of the politics
underlying debates over free speech.66 Douglas Reed has
recently surveyed the constitutional politics of educational financing.67 While most political scientists emphasize the instrumental uses of constitutional rhetoric, John
Brigham observes how constitutional norms shape the way
political actors conceptualize their institution’s roles and
their political interests.68
The constitution outside the courts is a growth industry in political science. Pioneering works by Louis Fisher,
Sanford Levinson, John Agresto, Sotorios Barber, and Susan
Burgess highlight constitutional interpretation by presi-

dents, legislators, and political activists.69 Official constitutional meanings at any moment in time, they point out,
usually result from dialogues between justices and elected
officials. When solos are performed, the artist is most often
the president. Whittington points out that on such constitutional matters as the appropriate standard for impeaching Supreme Court justices, only Congress has made
constitutional decisions. Those decisions are regarded as
having similar precedential value as analogous judicial rulings.70 John Dinan elaborates numerous instances where
legislators better protected constitutional rights than
justices.71
Foregoing traditional doctrinal approaches to constitutional law, political scientists document how broader currents of American political thought influence constitutional
development inside and outside of courts. Gillman demonstrates that the judicial decisions protecting freedom of
contract at the turn of the twentieth century are better
explained by the historical animus against class legislation
than by Social Darwinist notions of laissez-faire.72 Rogers
Smith details how judicial decisions reflect changing conceptions of American liberalism.73 A flourishing school of
feminist thought in political science is exploring the influence of gender in American constitutional development.
Julie Novkov explains how concepts originally employed
to justify protective legislation for women provided problematic constitutional foundations for the entire regulatory state during the New Deal.74 Judith Baer’s work
highlights the continuing importance of gender in numerous areas of American constitutional law.75

“Have Nothing to Do with the Case”
The public law scholars who offer these original political
science perspectives on constitutionalism revert to playing
little law professor when they teach the basic constitutional law sequence. The primary text in the standard
upper-level course on American constitutionalism is a casebook. The primary readings are judicial opinions. Professors rarely assign their own innovative scholarship or any
contemporary works by political scientists on American
constitutionalism. Written assignments are often case briefs,
legal briefs, or mock judicial opinions. Despite the great
diversity of methodological approaches in the public law
field, assignments look alike. Few political science professors would have to do much more than change the order
of their lectures were they required to teach from another
professor’s syllabi.76
Doctrine dominates the requiring reading in political
science courses on American constitutionalism. With rare
exceptions (Grossman 2003; Kahn 2003; Whittington
1998), far more than half the assigned readings in the
basic constitutionalism sequence are cases. Many courses
are devoted entirely to judicial decisions. Few syllabi even
do justice to the professor’s preferred perspective.77 Leading
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behavioralists fail to assign scholarship on the attitudinal
and strategic models of judicial decision-making. Humanists fail to assign any contemporary study of American
constitutional development.
Political science does seep into undergraduate constitutional law courses. Political science perspectives are offered
during lectures and tested on during examinations. Most
professors use a casebook edited by political scientists. The
introductions, marginal notes, and selections for further
readings in these works offer a glimpse of non-legal perspectives on constitutionalism. While many professors rely
exclusively on cases or casebooks, most require supplemental reading. The most popular supplement, Robert McCloskey and Sanford Levinson’s The American Supreme Court
(2000), can be used to explore attitudinal, strategic, and
legal perspectives on judicial decision making.78 Relying
on a work first published in 1960 to present contemporary political science perspectives on constitutionalism,
however, is the pedagogical equivalent of relying exclusively on The American Voter to present contemporary political science perspectives on voting behavior.79
Judicial writings have an important place in the political science curriculum—they just should not have the near
exclusive place of honor. Students should be taught how
to read the lengthy excerpts from judicial opinions regularly published in major newspapers. Opinions call attention to broader currents in American political thought,
highlight important elements of American political development, and provide grist for class discussions on contested questions of civil liberties and government power.
Efforts to explain judicial decisions require some attention to the explanations justices give for their rulings. These
reasons for including judicial opinions, however, hardly
justify the extensive attention given to judicial opinions in
almost every basic course on constitutionalism. Too
obsessed with legal writing, most public law syllabi surveyed include much material that students do not understand and political scientists are not prepared to teach.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous dissent in
Abrams v. United States (1919) illustrates some difficulties
with assigning lengthy excerpts from judicial opinions in
undergraduate classes. Jacob Abrams was convicted under
the Sedition Act of 1918 after he called for a general strike
protesting American intervention in the Russian Revolution. The judicial majority in Abrams sustained the conviction, even though the Sedition Act only punished efforts
to interfere with the war effort against Germany. The judicial majority reasoned that Abrams knew that a general
strike would interfere with all military engagements abroad,
not just American interference with the Russian Revolution. Justice Holmes disagreed. Most political science
courses on civil liberties sensibly require students to read
the famous passage in the Holmes dissent in which the
justice declared, “[T]he best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
140 Perspectives on Politics

the market.” 80 Students are also, however, assigned the
less famous sections, interpreting the Sedition Act of 1918
as requiring a specific intention to interfere with the war
against Germany.81 The latter passages sow confusion.
Second-year law students who have previously taken a
course in criminal law may understand the theory of criminal attempt underlying the legal reasons Holmes gives for
insisting that Jacob Abrams could not be punished under
the Sedition Act of 1918. Few undergraduates are similarly prepared. Whether a majority of political science professors have a working knowledge of the common law of
criminal attempts is doubtful. Those who do are unlikely
to spend scarce class time imparting that knowledge to
students. If students are unlikely to understand the legal
argument interpreting the Sedition Act, and professors are
unlikely to explain the legal argument, what is the point
of assigning that legal argument?
Similar problems of competence and preparation exist
throughout the undergraduate syllabus. Most constitutional law classes begin with Marbury v. Madison (1803),
the first instance of the Supreme Court discussing at length
the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional. The
assigned excerpts from Marbury in all constitutional law
texts include lengthy discussion of jurisdictional issues associated with writs of mandamus and appellate practice likely
to be incomprehensible to students who have not had
first-year civil procedure. Supreme Court opinions interpreting the provision in the Fifth Amendment that declares
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation” assume knowledge of basic concepts taught in first-year law courses on property. Few
undergraduates understand the reference to “background
principles of nuisance” that plays a crucial role in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council (1992), a commonly
assigned case. The constitutional law of libel rests on common law tort principles. Most undergraduates do not know
what a tort is. Hardly any understand the legal differences
between “recklessness” and “negligence,” which, assigned
cases inform them, are crucial to determining when private and public figures may obtain damages in defamation
suits.82
Written assignments promise further confusion. With
rare exceptions, the professors who require undergraduate
students to write legal briefs, participate in moot court
exercises, or pen a mock judicial opinion have never litigated a case, engaged in oral argument, or been a judicial
clerk. The average undergraduate “brief ” is an essay on
some point of constitutional law that only dimly corresponds to what advocates submit to judicial tribunals. No
syllabi examined for this review suggests that undergraduates learn the distinctive brief-writing skills routinely
taught in first year legal writing. Having undergraduates
do written and oral presentations is part of good teaching.
Still, claims that students in political science courses learn
legal writing and legal advocacy are misleading at best.

Overall, the standard constitutional law/civil liberties
class largely provides an inferior overview of materials that
will be taught with far more skill in law school. Undergraduates are repeatedly confronted with opinions they
cannot adequately comprehend and pseudo-legal assignments outside their instructors’ area of expertise. Whether
such a curriculum would make pedagogical sense if most
students in undergraduate constitutional law classes did
not plan to attend law school is doubtful. And given the
high percentages of students who will reprise constitutional law within three years, most constitutional law
courses in political science are educationally redundant.
Labels matter. Political scientists inherit courses entitled “Constitutional Law I: Structure of Government”
and “Constitutional Law II: Civil Rights and Liberties.”
Assistant professors who receive this bequest assume they
are supposed to teach constitutional law. Besides, political
scientists from their academic infancy learn that constitutional law is about judicial opinions. They are taught constitutional law as undergraduates and lead discussions on
constitutional law when graduate section leaders. This pedagogical inertia explains why constitutional law courses
assign lengthy excerpts from Justice Holmes’s dissent in
Abrams, even though very few political scientists claim
particular expertise in doctrinal analysis, while ignoring
The Hollow Hope, even though most political scientists
teaching these courses do have particular expertise on the
effect of judicial decisions. Courses labeled “Constitutional Politics” might inspire different assignments. Judicial capacity to produce progressive reform is clearly an
issue for constitutional politics. The details of Holmes’s
Abrams dissent is not.

From Constitutional Law to
Constitutional Politics
Public law courses on the structure of government and
civil liberties should emphasize constitutionalism, not law.
Professors who associate constitutionalism with limited
government 83 should assign scholarship examining various restraints on government power and the capacity of
different institutions to enforce those restrictions. More
sophisticated conceptions of constitutionalism recognize
that constitutions empower as well as limit.84 “The vigor
of government,” Alexander Hamilton pointed out in Federalist 1, “is essential to the security of liberty.” 85 Courses
devoted to more positive conceptions of constitutionalism could explore the goals and aspirations of particular
constitutional orders, the institutions thought necessary
to achieve those goals and aspirations, and the people
assumed to share those goals and operate the relevant institutions.86 Constitutional issues associated with the contemporary welfare state encourage discussions on the best
constitutional understanding of equality, whether federalism promotes democratic experimentation or races to the

bottom, and the ways popular beliefs about political economy influence constitutional policy making. A constitutionalism conceived so broadly encompasses all political
science and many other disciplines.87 Fortunately, manageable political science courses can easily be organized
around particular constitutional concerns.
“The Supreme Court in the Constitutional Order”
and “Enforcing Constitutional Rights and Limitations”
are two such courses. Readings for the first help students
evaluate theories about what courts should do in light of
political science research on what courts have done and
are capable of doing. Appropriate texts include a recent
anthology on Supreme Court decision making,88 the leading work on the attitudinal model of judicial decision
making,89 the leading work on the strategic model of
judicial decision making,90 a collection of essays exploring historical and legal understandings of judicial decision making,91 a study on the process by which justices
are appointed and confirmed,92 Rosenberg’s 1991 work
on the impact of Supreme Court decisions, a political
history of the Supreme Court,93 and a smattering of
judicial opinions discussing judicial power or illustrating
judicial policy making. Readings for the second explore
how various institutions, including but not limited to
the judiciary, protect various constitutional rights and
restrain government actors. Appropriate works include
The Federalist Papers, contemporary defenses 94 and criticisms 95 of existing constitutional institutions, a collection of essays exploring different ways constitutions protect
rights,96 Dinan’s 1998 work evaluating the relative capacity of justices and elected officials to protect rights, Whittington’s study of constitutional debate by elected
officials,97 Gordon Silverstein’s analysis of the constitutional separation of powers,98 Goldstein’s 2001 work comparing constitutional protections for federalism in Europe
and the United States, and a smattering of judicial opinions discussing or illustrating judicial capacity to protect
rights and limit government.
Numerous other organizing themes are possible. Courses
in constitutionalism might have separate units considering the political foundations of judicial review, strategic
behavior by justices, comparative constitutionalism, and
other issues. These topics may inhibit the common tendency to divide the constitutional universe into political
institutions and civil liberties, a division that ignores how
political institutions are designed to privilege certain civil
rights and liberties.99 An historically minded political scientist might teach a two-term sequence comprising a course
on constitutional development and a course on contemporary constitutional problems.
Terri Peretti’s In Defense of a Political Court is a far
better core text for undergraduate courses on constitutional law than the standard casebook. It combines a behavioral perspective on judicial behavior with a normative
analysis of the judicial function. Peretti regards justices as
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unalloyed policy makers who consistently base judicial
decisions entirely on policy preferences. In her view, “[T]he
evidence is compelling that policy making on the Supreme
Court is a reflection of the ideological preferences of the
justices.” 100 A tribunal engaged in naked policy making,
she insists, promotes such desirable ends as political participation and pluralism. “The opportunities for groups
to gain access to and have an effective voice in government policymaking are greatly expanded,” Peretti writes,
when courts have the power to declare laws unconstitutional.101 The more political the court, the more democratic the constitutional politics. Peretti concludes,
“[P]olitical motive in constitutional decisionmaking ensures
that the Court exercises its power in a politically responsible and democratically defensible manner.” 102
Numerous political science works examining the practice and theory of constitutionalism might be packaged
with In Defense of a Political Court. Ronald Kahn’s The
Supreme Court and Constitutional Theory, 1953–1993 provides an account of contemporary judicial decision making that is more legal than Peretti’s. Kahn insists that justices
make decisions on the basis of constitutional principles
“because they view the Court as a countermajoritarian
legal institution and share a concern for the legitimacy of
the Supreme Court and the rule of law.” 103 Hirschl’s Toward
Juristocracy, discussed above, questions whether judicial
review promotes pluralism and participation. Courts, in
his view, secure elite interests. The Federalist Papers might
promote discussions about whether political participation
or government by the best persons is the more vital constitutional value in the United States.104 Students’ tendency to assume that their values are constitutional
values 105 can be combated by requiring Constitutional
Stupidities, Constitutional Tragedies.106 This anthology
regards numerous constitutional institutions as badly flawed
and desperately needing reform. “How,” Suzanna Sherry
asks in one essay, “can a democratic nation tolerate a Senate in which the largest state has more than sixty-five times
the population of the smallest and yet each has two senators?” 107 Such readings better prepare students for law
school and citizens for political life than courses that place
greater emphasis on such legal technicalities as the negative radiations of the commerce clause 108 and the aptly
named three-part Lemon test.109
Constitutional politics restores normative concerns to
public law analysis without taking sides in the methodological debates presently exciting political science. All
theories of constitutionalism make empirical assumptions—assumptions that political scientists can expose,
explore, and explode. The grand constitutional theory tradition begun during the 1950s by Herbert Wechsler 110
and Alexander Bickel 111 assumes that justices have unique
capacities to decide policy questions on the basis of fundamental values.112 The attitudinal model, studies on the
political foundations of judicial review, and scholarship
142 Perspectives on Politics

on the constitution outside the courts question this
pervasive vision of judicial review as principled justices
standing up to unprincipled elected officials. “Immortal
principles fly their standards in judicial opinions,” Thomas
Reed Powell noted almost a century ago, “[b]ut so they do
in the common every-day talk of the butcher and banker,
of the suffragist and the anti-suffragist, the pacifist and the
militarist, the Socialist and the individualist.” 113
Rather than hypothesize ideal states, students taking
constitutional politics should explore the institutions necessary to pursue desirable ends and the extent to which
present institutions serve or are capable of being reformed
to serve those purposes. Constitutionalism classes taking a
political science perspective should encourage identification of good constitutional practices and the institutional
prerequisites for securing them. Students debating whether
the president is constitutionally authorized to send troops
into foreign combat in the absence of a Congressional
declaration of war would be asked to consider whether
contemporary legislators have the political capacities and
incentives necessary to oppose presidential wars. Those
who rail against a jurisprudence of values should remember that in the absence of a theory about normatively
desirable states of affairs only morbid curiosity explains
the choice to study judicial votes rather than judicial
toenails.
That undergraduate courses on constitutionalism are
overpopulated by pre-laws does not justify teaching a
preview of coming attractions. Medical educators encourage undergraduates to take courses on medical humanities that provide critical overviews on subjects taught in
medical school. The political science curriculum should
similarly provide pre-law and other students with critical
behavioral, rational, and humanistic social science perspectives on the law and courts. Doctrinal analysis and
legal writing are best left to law professors who specialize
in doctrinal analysis and legal writing. Political science
courses on the Supreme Court should explore the role
that tribunal has historically played in American politics,
the political foundations of contemporary judicial practice, and the broader political changes necessary for the
judiciary to play some other function.114 Courses on constitutional powers and rights should examine the political foundations of limited government, the constitutional
understandings privileged by the present array of governing institutions, the institutions necessary to privilege a
more desirable set of constitutional understandings, and
the means, if any, by which the constitutional system
might be reformed to privilege that more desirable set of
constitutional understandings. Political scientists teaching constitutional law will find a wealth of political
science materials when they adopt these and other perspectives on constitutionalism. Little more is needed than
a commitment to preach faithfully in the classroom what
we practice religiously in our scholarship.

Appendix
Specialty seminars
Calvert, Randall. Washington University, St. Louis. Fall
2004. Constitutional politics in the United States.
http://artsci.wustl.edu/;polisci/calvert/PolSci3103.
Levy, Jacob T. University of Chicago. Spring 2001. Constitutionalism (combined graduate and undergraduate
course).
Whittington, Keith E. Princeton University. Spring
1998. Constitutional theory.
Cases or casebook only
Baer, Judith. Texas A&M University. Spring 2002. Constitutional developments.
Davis, Jeffrey. University of Maryland, Baltimore. Spring
2003. American constitutional law.
Epstein, Lee. Washington University. Spring 2001. Constitutional law.
Graber, Mark A. University of Maryland, College Park.
Fall 2002. Constitutional law.
Keck, Tom. Syracuse University. N.d. Constitutional
law II.
Lermack, Paul. Bradley University. January 2003. Political science 460.
Lopeman, Sam. State University of West Georgia. Fall
2000. Constitutional law I.
Powers, Thomas. University of Minnesota–Duluth.
Spring 2003. American constitutional law II: Civil
liberties.
Schweber, Howard. University of Wisconsin. Spring
2003. Constitutional law.
Segel, Jeffrey. State University of New York at Stony
Brook. N.d. Constitutional law.
Zorn, Christopher. Emory University. Spring 2003.
Civil liberties.
Cases or casebook plus one other book
Dean, Karen, Illinois College. N.d. Civil liberties.
Dehnel. Dave. Augustana College. Winter 2001–2. Constitutional law I.
Foster, James. Oregon State University. Fall 2002. American constitutional law.
Fruchtman, Jack. Towson University. Spring 2003. Constitutional law II
Gillman, Howard. University of Southern California.
Fall 2003. Constitutional law.
Jacobsohn, G.J., Williams College. Fall 2001. Constitutional law (I).
Kessler, Mark. Bates College. Winter 2001–2. Constitutional freedoms.
O’Brien, David M. University of Virginia. Spring 2003.
Civil rights and civil liberties.
Reisert, Joseph R. Colby College. Fall 2002. Constitutional law I.

Swinford, Bill. University of Richmond. N.d. Civil
rights and liberties.
Cases or casebook plus more than one outside
reading, but dominant assignments are cases
Arkes, Hadley. Amherst College. Fall 2001. The American Constitution II.
Finn, John E. Wesleyan University. Spring 2001. American constitutional interpretation.
Fruchtman, Jack. Towson University. Fall 1999. Constitutional law I.
Gillman, Howard. University of Southern California.
Fall 2001. Constitutional law.
Jacobsohn, G.J. Williams College. Spring 2003. Constitutional Law (II).
Kessler, Mark. Bates College. Winter 2002–3. Race and
civil rights in constitutional interpretation.
Kobylka, Joseph. Southern Methodist University. Spring
2002. The constitutional law of civil liberties.
Puro, Steven. St. Louis University. Fall 2002. American constitutional law.
Smith, Kimberly. Carleton College. Spring 2002. American constitutional law II (a history text, but a high percentage of assignments appear to be cases).
Smith, Rogers M. University of Pennsylvania. Fall 2002.
American constitutional law.
Weber, Paul J. University of Louisville. Fall 2001. Constitutional law.
Casebook plus numerous (mostly) law review essays
Kahn, Ronald. Oberlin University. Spring 2003. American constitutional law.
Casebook plus substantial political science readings
Grossman, Joel. Johns Hopkins University. Spring 2003.
Constitutional law.
Whittington, Keith E. Princeton University. Fall 1998.
Constitutional interpretation.
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Shapiro 1983, 543.
Ibid., 543–44.
Shapiro 1989, 102.
How well these law professors make use of political science scholarship is contestable. Compare Rosenberg
2000 with Graber 2002.
McCloskey 2000. Sanford Levinson emphasizes that
he made “the basic decision to add to, rather than genuinely revise, [McCloskey’s] book.” Levinson 2000, ix.
See, for example, the “specialty seminars” listed in
the appendix.
Eskridge 1991; Cross 1997; Griffin 1996; Stearns
2000; Klarman 1996.
Kalman 1996.
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Powe 2000.
Tushnet 1999; see also Sunstein 1999.
The seminal work in this literature is Dahl 1957.
Epstein and Knight 1998.
Rosenberg 1991.
Graber 2003.
Graber 1993; Hirschl 2004.
Marshall 1989; Mishler and Sheehan 1993.
Franklin and Kosaki 1989.
Fiss 1989, 255; Michelman 1988, 1537.
Smith 1985.
Smith 1997.
Rosenberg 1991, 31.
Tocqueville 1990, 272–80; Rosenberg 1991, 10–13.
Rosenberg 1991, 13–15.
Ibid., 15–21.
Ibid., 39–169.
Ibid., 336–43.
Schultz 1998. For an excellent study of the judicial
capacity to produce social change with less emphasis
on constitutional issues, see Feeley and Rubin
1998.
McCann 1994.
Klarman 1994. See also Klarman 2001.
Murphy 1964.
The seminal works in the strategic tradition are
Epstein and Knight 1998; Epstein and Knight
1999; Epstein and Walker 1995; Knight and Epstein
1996. See also Cross 1998, 513 nn. 8–10, citing
numerous articles on judicial strategy published by positive political theorists.
Segal and Spaeth 1993; Segal and Spaeth 2002.
Epstein, Knight, and Martin 2001, 585.
Friedman 2002.
Epstein, Knight, and Martin 2001.
Ex parte Milligan.
Ex parte McCardle; Georgia v. Stanton; Mississippi v.
Johnson.
Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000.
Rogers 2001, 87.
Ibid., 94.
Bickel 1962, 16–17.
Graber 1993; Silverstein and Ginsberg 1987; Whittington 2003.
Gillman 2002.
The decisions are, respectively, United States v. E.C.
Knight Co.; Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co.; In
re Debs; and Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway
Co. v. Illinois.
Gillman 2002, 511, 512.
McMahon 2004.
Pickerill and Clayton 2004.
Whittington, forthcoming; Whittington 2001.
Lawrence 1990; Epp 1998.
Hirschl 2004, 11.
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51
52
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59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
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76

77

78
79
80
81
82

Ibid., 1.
Ibid., 12.
Ibid., 14.
Sweet 2000.
Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2001.
Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998.
Goldstein 2001.
Jacobsohn 2003.
Tarr 1998; Hall 2001.
Segal and Spaeth 2002; Spaeth and Segal 1999.
Pinello 2003.
Yalof 1999; Maltese 1995; Silverstein 1994; Goldman 1997. The seminal work in this literature is Abraham 1999.
Representative works include Barber and George
2001; Barber 1984; Moore 1996; Brandon 1998;
Harris 1993.
Clinton 1989; Franck 1996; Wolfe 1986; Stoner
2003; Whittington 1999b.
Davis 1989; Brisbin 1997; Maveety 1996; Gerber
1999.
Downs 1989; Downs 1985.
Reed 2001.
Brigham 1987; Brigham 1996.
Fisher 1988; Levinson 1988; Burgess 1992; Agresto
1984; Devins 1996; Barber 1984. An earlier, too
often neglected, work in this tradition is Morgan
1966.
Whittington 1999a.
Dinan 1998.
Gillman 1993. For a study of American free speech
theory in this vein, see Graber 1991.
Smith 1985.
Novkov 2001. For a similar study in this vein, see
Ritter 2002.
Baer 1999.
The syllabi reviewed for this essay were randomly
collected by the staff of Perspectives on Politics and
through a solicitation on the Law and Courts
Discussion List. I did make sure that several
representatives of all major schools of public law
thought were included.
Members of the Princeton school of constitutional
thought are the only political scientists who have at
their disposal a casebook that (barely) reflects their
perspective on constitutionalism. See Murphy, Fleming, and Barber 1995.
McCloskey 2000. These supplementary readings do
not include any of the political science works discussed in the previous section.
Campbell et al. 1960.
Abrams v. United States, at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Abrams v. United States, at 626–29 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See Graber 1991, 110.
See, for example, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

109

110
111
112
113
114

See Sartori 1962.
Maddox 1982.
Rossiter 1961, 35.
Elkin 2001, 1948; Graber 2001, 1971.
Coyle 1999.
Clayton and Gillman 1999.
Segal and Spaeth 2002.
Epstein and Knight 1998.
Gillman and Clayton 1999.
Yalof 1999.
McCloskey 2000.
Brinkley, Polsby, and Sullivan 1997.
Eskridge and Levinson 1998.
Goldwin and Schambra 1985.
Whittington 1999a.
Silverstein 1997.
Vile 1998.
Peretti 1999, 102.
Ibid., 219.
Ibid., 5.
Kahn 1994, 4.
For the elitist commitments of the framers, see Rossiter 1961, 43, 47, 82–83, 174, 455, 458–59.
Smith 1998.
Eskridge and Levinson 1998.
Sherry 1998, 93.
The negative radiations of the commerce clause
refers to the circumstances under which the
Supreme Court will strike down state laws that interfere with interstate commerce, even though those
laws are not inconsistent with any national law. See,
for example, Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town
of Harrison.
The three-part Lemon test, named after Lemon v.
Kurtzman (1971), addresses a state law conflicting
with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. To be sustained, such laws must have a secular purpose; their primary effect must not be to
advance religion, and they cannot foster an excessive entanglement between religion and the state.
Wechsler 1959.
Bickel 1962.
For a summary of the empirical presuppositions of
grand constitutional theory, see Graber 2002.
Powell 1918, 647–48.
The sort of “nattering at justices” that takes place
in the law reviews, such courses might emphasize,
has so far not been an effective strategy for changing the direction of judicial decisions. Tushnet 1999,
155.
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